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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
!viAURICE CHARLES CHARVOZ, 
Administrator of the Estate of 
MAURICE BRUCE CARVOZ, { 
Deceased, Plaintiff and Appellant, .· 
' 
\ 
\ vs. WENDELL L. COTTRELL, 
Defendant and Respondent. f 
No. 
'9334 
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
This is a wrongful death case. 
Maurice Bruce Crarvoz was struck and killed by an auto-
mobile driven by the defendant. The collision occurred about 
7:00 P.M. on the evening of October 26, 1959, at the inter-
section of 17th South and 19th East Streets in Salt Lake City. 
At the time Charvoz was walking south across 17th South in 
the pedestrian crosswalk paralleling 19th East on the west 
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side, the defendant was driving east on 17th South m the 
south traffic lane. 
Seventeenth South at this point is a blacktop street 3 7 
feet 2 inches wide. A traffic division line is marked on the road 
20 feet 8 inches from the north curb and 16 feet 6 inches from 
the south curb. The pedestrian lane on the west side of 19th 
East was 8 feet wide and clearly marked. A street light projects 
into the street on the southwest corner of the intersection. At 
the time of the collision the weather was clear, the roads were 
dry and the evening was fairly dark (R. 4-12). Attached hereto 
marked Appendix "A" (Ex. P. 1) is a diagram of the inter-
section with certain pertinent measurements marked there as 
testified to in the case by Officer Diaz, the investigating officer. 
On the evening of the accident Bruce Charvoz was an 
unmarried man 25 years of age. He resided with his parents 
and worked with his mother in a business known as the Salt 
Lake Shirt Shop. During his childhood he had suffered from 
encephalitis, which had left him with impaired muscular co-
ordination. There is a dispute in the evidence as to whether 
or not the disease had also affected his mental capacity. How-
ever, that dispute is not material to this appeal. 
Shortly prior to the accident Bruce had left the Highland 
Stake Meeting House located on 19th East north of 17th South. 
He was seen by witnesses D. Ford Crandall and Mrs. Crandall 
to enter 17th South in the crosswalk (R. 84, 87, 88). He 
proceeded south until he was struck at a point 26 feet 11 
inches from the north curb and 10 feet 3 inches from the south 
curb. Cottrell at the time was driving his car east on 17th 
South. Cottrell estimated his speed at from 30 to 3 5 miles 
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per hour. His speed was estimated at 42 miles per hour by 
the investigating officer. However, the question of speed is not 
one of the points relied upon in this appeal. The defendant 
testified that he first saw Bruce when the automobile was 60 
feet from the point of impact and Bruce was approximately 
6 feet from the point of impact. The defendant testified that 
at the time he first saw Bruce, Bruce was walking at a normal 
gait as he continued to do with his head down, apparently 
oblivious of the approach of the automobile (R. 123, 128). 
The defendant did not sound his horn, nor did he turn his 
car from a direct path (R. 139). He applied his brakes and 
laid down skid marks averaging 14 feet in length before the 
point of impact and 56 feet after impact (Ex. P. 1). Bruce's 
body was knocked or carried 49 feet 6 inches. He died on 
the day after the collision as a result of the injuries received. 
This case was tried before a jury in the Court of the 
Third District Judge Aldon J. Anderson. The jury returned 
a verdict of no cause of action. The plaintiff moved for a new 
trial in the Court below based upon the errors hereinafter set 
forth. The moton for new . trail was denied. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
The plaintiff and appellant relies upon the following 
points in seeking a reversal of the verdict in the Court below 
and a new trial of the issues: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 TO THE 
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EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 TO THE 
JURY IN REGARD TO THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR 
CHANCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 2 read as follows: 
"You are instructed that the evidence establishes, 
as a matter of law that the defendant was negligent 
and that his negligence proximately contributed to the 
death of the decedent, therefore, you should :find the 
the issues of liability against the defendant and in favor 
of the plaintiff unless you should also find that the 
decedent was contributorily negligent and that such 
negligence on the part of the decedent proximately 
contributed to his death." 
The Court refused to give this instruction. 
The plaintiff was entitled to this instruction only if the 
undisputed evidence established that the defendant was negli-
gent in one or more particulars. A number of grounds of 
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negligence were relied upon by the plaintiff as set forth in 
the pretrial order. On some of these grounds the evidence is 
in dispute. On others, there is no dispute. In fact, they are 
established by the defendant's own testimony. The plaintiff 
maintained that the defendant was driving at an excessive 
speed. As to this issue, the evidence is in conflict. The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to have 
his automobile under propert control. Here too, there is a 
conflict in evidence. It was alleged that the defendant's auto-
mobile was not equipped with proper and sufficient brakes. 
There is little evidence from the plaintiff on this point. The 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing 
to give the decedent a warning of his approach. There is a 
conflict in the evidence as to whether or not. the defendant 
had sufficient time to do this after actually discovering the 
presence of the decedent. There is no dispute. in the evidence, 
however, as to the remaining two grounds of. negligence relied 
upon by the plaintiff: 
A. The defendant failed to keep a proper lookout and 
B. The defendant failed to yield the right of way to the 
decedent. 
Under the defendant's own testimony he .first saw Bruce 
when Bruce was 6 feet from the point of impact and the auto-
mobile 60 feet from the point of impact (R. 136). Bruce 
continued to walk at a set pace until the collision. (R. 139). 
This establishes that Bruce was walking approximately 3 
miles per hour which the Court can take judicial notice is a 
normal gait. Bruce had proceeded 26 feet 11 inches into the 
intersection when the impact occurred (Ex. P. 1) establishing 
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that the defendant's car was approximately 270 feet west of the 
crosswalk when Bruce entered the street. The defendant 
testified that his lights were burning and were adjusted in 
accordance with the law under the provisions of Section 41-
6-134 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1953 (R. 146). The lights 
must therefore have been able to pick up anyone in the road 
at a distance of 100 feet. When the defendant's automobile 
was 100 feet from the point of impact, Bruce was already 
more than 16 feet into the street and was almost to the center 
line. He was walking at a normal gait. The defendant did 
not see Bruce at this point but saw him only when the auto-
mobile was 60 feet from the point of impact. However, at 
either the time at which the defendant should have seen Bruce 
or the time he did see Bruce, Bruce was within the crosswalk 
and was approaching so closely from the opposite half of the 
roadway as to be in danger under the provisions of Section 
41-6-78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. It was the obligation of 
the defendant to yield the right of way. The evidence is clear 
that he did not do it. 
The defendant's own witness, Sergeant Pitcher, testified 
on cross examination that had the defendant seen Bruce at 100 
feet and assuming a speed of 30 miles per hour as testified 
to by the defendant, the defendant could have brought his 
car to a stop before ever reaching the crosswalk (R. 165). 
The defendant tried to excuse his failure to see Bruce 
earlier by claiming that the corner post of his automobile 
blocked the view (R. 136). The uncontradicted testimony of 
the Witness Tipton, an engineer, however, was that the angle 
of vision of the automobile in question was sufficient so that 
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at 60 feet from the point of impact the defendant could not 
only have seen Bruce where he was walking, but could see clear 
to the curb on the north side of the street and at 100 feet from 
the point of impact he could see a considerable distance to the 
north of the curb (R. 170, Ex. P. 11). Under these circum-
stances, therefore, there can be no jury question but that the 
failure of the defendant to see Bruce when the defendant was 
100 feet from the point of impact was due to no other cause 
than negligent inattention. Had he seen him at that point, he 
could have brought his car to a stop before ever reaching the 
crosswalk. This negligent inattention, therefore, was a proxi-
mate contributing cause of the accident. Furthermore, there 
can be no dispute but that under the Statutes of the State of 
Utah the right of way belonged to the pedestrian and it was 
negligence on the part of the motorist who failed to yield it. 
Such failure to yield obviously was a proximate contributing 
cause to the accident. 
The question of the defendant's negligence, therefore, 
should not have been left to the jury. The only matters which 
should have been left to the jury was the question of the con-
tributory negligence of the pedestrian and the question of 
damages. 
The matter of taking the question of negligence from the 
deliberation of the jury was passed upon by this Court in the 
case of Frank v. McCarty, 188 P.2d 737. Although the matter 
there concerned was the question of contributory negligence, 
the principles are the same. The Court stated: 
"However, if reasonable minds would not be war-
ranted in reaching any conclusion other than that 
plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence in light 
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of the plaintiff's own testimony or other undisputed 
fact, there is no jury question but a question of law 
for the Court." 
Plaintiff therefore represents that the lower Court erred in 
leaving to the jury the question of defendant's negligence and 
in refusing to instruct the jury that the defendant was negligent 
as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 TO THE 
JURY IN REGARD TO THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR 
Plaintiff does not bear such a heavy burden in regard to 
Point II as was the case under Point I above. Under Point I 
we were entitled to the requested instruction if, but only if, 
the defendant was clearly guilty of negligence either under 
his own evidence or under the undisputed and incontrovertible 
evidence in the case. In regard to Point II we were entitled 
to have the requested instruction given if there was evidence 
in the record from which the jury could have made an affirma-
tive finding as to each of the conditions giving rise to the 
doctrine of last clear chance. Graham v. Johnson, 166 P.2d 
230 at Page 238. 
Our requested instruction was copied verbatim from Page 
63 and 64 of the Uniform Jury Instructions of Utah. This 
instruction covers the last clear chance doctrine applicable 
to the situation where the plaintiff is not in a position of help-
less peril but was by reason of inattention or lack of alertness 
moving into a position of danger without realizing the poten-
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tial peril. The instruction sets forth six propositions that must 
be met by the evidence in order for the jury to apply the 
doctrine of last clear chance. This case appears to be a classic 
example for the application of the last clear chance as it applies 
to a negligently inattentive plaintiff. Let us examine each 
one of the six conditions to see how the evidence here fits. 
The first condition that must be met is that the plaintiff 
must have been in a position of danger. Certainly this cannot 
be doubted. The plaintiff was in the roadway in a pedestrian 
crosswalk moving at a speed which, unless something were 
done to change the situation, would bring him into direct 
collision with the automobile. 
Secondly, the evidence must establish that the person 
injured was by reason of inattention or lack of proper alertness 
totally unaware of the peril that threatened to him. We have 
only to look at the defendant's own testimony to establish 
this proposition. He testified that Bruce was walking with his 
head down paying no attention to the approaching auto-
mobile (R. 128). 
In the third place we must establish that the defendant 
actually saw the plaintiff and knew of his perilous position. 
The defendant's own testimony is that he actually saw the 
plaintiff and knew of his perilous position when the automobile 
was 60 feet from the point of impact. 
The fourth proposition which we must establish is that 
the defendant then realized, or by the exercise of due care 
should have realized, that Bruce was unaware of the danger. 
Once again we need look only to the defendant's own testimony. 
11 
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The defendant testified that Bruce was walking at a steady 
gait, not looking at all at the car but walking directly into the 
path of it (R. 128). Certainly, the jury could well have found, 
in fact would almost be forced to find, that the defendant 
in the exercise of reasonable care should have recognized that 
Bruce was unaware of the danger. 
As a fifth proposition we must establish that at such time 
there existed an opportunity in the defendant by the exercise 
of ordinary care to have avoided the collision. The defendant 
first saw Bruce at a distance of 60 feet. At the speed at which 
he was going at the time the application of his brakes would 
not have stopped him before he reached the point of impact. 
The time that the brakes should have been applied was at a 
distance of 100 feet, at which time he could have seen Bruce 
had he been looking. However, when the defendant observed 
the peril at 60 feet he could have done one of two things to 
have avoided the accident-he could have sounded his horn, 
or he could have turned slightly to the right and thus have 
avoided the collision entirely. He did neither of these things 
but continued straight ahead (R. 139) . When the defendant 
first saw Bruce, Bruce was not in front of the car, although it 
was evident that he was going to be there unless he stopped 
walking. He was, however, at that time some four to six feet 
left of the automobile. A mere touch of the horn might have 
brought him up sharply before he ever entered the path of the 
automobile. Whether or not there was time to sound the horn 
and time for Bruce to stop was under all the circumstances 
a jury question. Furthermore, it appears clear that there was 
an opportunity for the defendant himself to have avoided 
the accident merely by turning to the right. He, himself, 
12 
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admitted that there were 10 feet of unobstructed roadway 
between the point of impact and the curb (R. 140). By turning 
to the right he could have missed Bruce by 4 feet and yet not 
have struck the curb. 
As a sixth proposition we must prove that the defendant 
negligently failed to avail himself of the opportunity to avoid 
the accident. The defendant himself admitted that he neither 
sounded his horn nor changed direction of the car (R. 139). 
Some earlier cases have held that the last clear chance 
doctrine based upon the negligent inattention theory is not 
applicable where the injured party is still moving when the 
peril is discovered by the defendant and also. when the collision 
occurs. This is not the rule in this state, however, nor is it the 
rule in the majority of jurisdictions elsewhere. In the case 
of Graham v. Johnson, 166 Pac. 2d, 230, the injured person 
was running westerly out of the roadway at the time he was 
struck. The court none the less held the doctrine of last clear 
chance applicable. In the case of Morby v. Rogers, 250 Pac. 
2d, 231, the injured party was riding a bicycle along the side 
of the road. Here also the Court held the doctrine to be 
applicable. In dismissing the fact that the boy on the bicycle 
was moving at the time of the accident, Judge Wolfe in his 
concurring opinion stated: 
"It was not a case of a rapid change of relative posi-
tions of two fast moving vehicles. The cycling boy 
was riding a comparatively slow-moving vehicle. This 
circumstance alone may give rise to a situation where 
it is incumbent on the jury to determine in respect to 
that vehicle whether the comparatively more rapid one 
had the clear opportunity to avoid the accident or 
13 
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m1t1gate 1t 1nto a possible minor collision. Certainly 
the vehicle which comes with the potentiality for sub-
stantial damage, as stated by Mr. Justice McDonough, 
owes a duty toward a lad on a frail vehicle which duty 
may not be discharged by the application of logic 
alone." 
The situation in this case is remarkably like that in Morby 
v. Rogers, except that here the evidence is much stronger in 
favor of the giving of a last clear chance instruction. In the 
Morby case the defendant did sound his horn one time. In this 
case he never did sound it at all. Likewise, in the Graham 
v. Johnson supra, the basis of the holding of the Court that 
the defendant could have avoided the collision was the failure 
to blow a horn. In the case now before the Court, there was 
much greater opportunity for the blowing of the horn than 
there was in the Graham v. Johnson case. Here the defendant 
was aware for 60 feet that Bruce was moving into the path 
of his vehicle. In the Johnson case Darlene Johnson moved 
only a very few feet between the time the boy started to run 
from his set pbsition in the street until he was struck. 
The facts in this case fall squarely within the provision 
of Section 480 of the Restatement of Torts. There was clearly 
evidence from which the jury could have found that the last 
clear chance doctrine was applicable. It was, therefore, error 
for the Court to refuse to give this instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the failure of the Court to give the 
two requested instructions was error which substantially preju-
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diced the rights of the plaintiff. The case should be sent back 
for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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